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STATE VERSUS FEDERAL REGULATION
OF COMMERCIAL AERONAUTICS
ROBERT F. MARIS
I. CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
Commercial air traffic is one of the most highly regulated of
American industries; federal, state and even local governments have
regulated different aspects of the industry. The basis of federal au-
thority in the field is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' This scheme
of law has been described as "comprehensive,"'. "intensive and ex-
clusive; ''3 an examination of the Act indicates that this sweeping
language is probably justified.
Several states have enacted laws dealing with aeronautics;' some
have even created their own aeronautics agencies. The states having
these agencies recognize the supremacy of federal authority in cer-
tain areas and try to avoid conflict; however, broad grants of author-
ity are often given to the state agencies in areas state legislatures
regard to be primarily of local interest.' The federal agencies, by
contrast, are primarily interested in the development of a national-
international scheme of air carriage based on sound economic con-
ditions and characterized by a high degree of safety. The federal
objectives may be at odds with a state commission that is primarily
concerned wth the development of commercial air service within a
single state. Since the state and federal agencies receive their statu-
tory mandates from different legislative bodies with different policy
149 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
2Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667, 670 (9th
Cir. 1972); afl'd, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
3Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
4 See 113 CONG. REC. 18298, 18299 (1967). (Letter from Charles Murphy,
Chmn. CAB).
5An example of these state regulatory bodies is the Texas Aeronautics Com-
mission. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-1-8 (Supp. 1970).
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goals, different emphases and decisional criteria between these
agencies will be common.'
The relative areas in which the federal and state governments can
regulate have caused confusion and litigation for many years. Fre-
quent points of contention include the right of the states to regulate
and tax interstate carriers operating within a single state and the
authority of the federal agencies to regulate intrastate carriers that
affect interstate commerce. Views concerning these jurisdictional
problems are diverse; ideas range from those asserting that the entire
field of air law has been preempted by Congress to those that would
allow the states to regulate any air carriage carried on within its
borders.
A. Constitutional Background
To fully appreciate the problems involved in the field of the regu-
lation of aeronautics, certain constitutional concepts, most particu-
larly the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,' must
be discussed. The commerce clause, which is the basis of federal
authority in the regulation of aeronautics, provides that Congress
shall have the power "[tlo regulate commerce with foreign [n]ations,
and among the several sites. . . " The Supreme Court first defined
"interstate commerce" in Gibbons v. Ogden." In Gibbons, the Court
described interstate commerce broadly as all "intercourse" between
the states." The Court also noted that the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is "plenary and complete" and that
this power may be exercised to its fullest extent without limitation.
While the Court in Gibbons delineated the extent of Congress'
power over interstate commerce, it did not clarify the scope of the
term. An important step toward defining the scope of interstate
commerce was made in The Daniel Ball" when the Court held that
not only may Congress regulate commerce crossing state lines, but
that certain intrastate activities could be brought within the concept
' See Texas Aeronautics Com'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199 at
201 (Tex. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Sweeney, Policy Formation
By the Civil Aeronautics Board, 16 J. Am L. & CoM. 127 (1949).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
1 Id. See Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
I01d. at 189.
177 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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of interstate commerce as well. A ship that operated exclusively on
a river within the state of Michigan was found to be regulatable by
Congress through its interstate commerce powers; the ship carried
goods destined for and brought from points outside Michigan. Ac-
cordingly, any link of interstate commerce, even an intrastate link,
can be regulated by Congress."
The federal authority created by the interstate commerce clause
extends to any activity that substantially affects interstate commerce
or the exercise of federal authority over that commerce. The sub-
stantial effects standard was established by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Wickard v. Filburn." Congress passed the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938 on the basis of its commerce powers. The
Act limited the amount of grain that farmers could grow and put
into interstate commerce. The Court found that the small amount of
wheat grown for home consumption by one Ohio farmer affected
interstate commerce enough to allow congressional regulation.'
Another Supreme Court case, Katzenbach v. McClung," further
elucidates this issue. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act that forbade racial discrimination in public facilities. A local
restaurateur was found to be in violation of the Act. The restaurant
was shown to have received most of its food from out of state
sources. This, together with the inhibitory effect on the interstate
travel of Negroes caused by the discrimination, had enough affect
on interstate commerce to allow the congressional regulation.
The plenary power of Congress to promote, protect and regulate
interstate commerce and transportation is clear. The scope of this
power in view of the substantial effects test is virtually without limit.
The potential power of Congress through the interstate commerce
clause may touch almost any activity occuring within or between
states. There is, however, "no constitutional rule which compels
Congress to occupy the whole field.""' Congress is free to circum-
"See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1946) where a cross-
town cab delivering interstate passengers between railroad stations was found to
be in interstate commerce. In Interior Airways, Inc. v. Wren Alaska Air Lines,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 107 (D. Alas. 1960), the court noted that the Congress could,
under the commerce powers, regulate intrastate air commerce.
13317 U.S. 111 (1942).
'"See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
"379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Kelly v. Washington ex. rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 at 10 (1937).
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scribe its regulation and occupy only a portion of the field. When
this is accomplished, the states may regulate outside the limited field
controlled by Congress."
State and local governments have traditionally been allowed to
regulate some facets of interstate commerce. This is especially true
when the regulated events are primarily of local interest. The Su-
preme Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens18 expressed this concept
well:
The power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in
nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operat-
ing equally on the commerce of the United States in every port;
and some.., as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone
can meet the local necessities of navigation."'
In Cooley, a local enactment requiring that a pilot familiar with
the peculiarities of the local waters guide all shipping within the
port of Philadelphia was found to be a subject suitable for state
regulation. When local regulations burden the flow of interstate com-
merce beyond what the Court views as permissible, however, the
regulation will be found unconstitutional.' In Southern Pacific Com-
pany v. Arizona for example, a local safety statute that limited the
number of cars a train could pull within the state of Arizona was
found to adversely affect railroad traffic in the surrounding states.'
If the subject is one that requires uniformity of regulation, the
power of Congress is exclusive and even if Congress chooses not to
exercise that power, state regulation will not be allowed. If, how-
ever, the area of interstate commerce does not require uniformity,
the local authorities may exercise power over it unless and until
Congress has occupied the field.
It is in those areas of interstate commerce that do not require
uniformity that the concept of federal preemption becomes impor-
tant. The doctrine of federal preemption has its roots in the su-
premacy clause of the United States Constitution.' "It establishes
17Id.
1854 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
19Id. at 319.
2"See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1958).
21325 U.S. 711 (1945).
' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides, that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
COMMENTS
as a principle of our federalism that state and local laws are not
enforceable if they impinge upon an exclusive federal domain."'
The courts have held that preemption occurs when Congress has
adopted a scheme for the regulation of a given subject matter that
reflects an intent by Congress to make that regulation exclusive. "
If this intent can be found, the states are deprived "of jurisdiction
over the matter embraced by the Congressional Act, regardless of
whether state law coincides with, is complementary to, or opposes
federal Congressional expression."'
The major Supreme Court decisions dealing with the problem
of federal preemption concur in the view that a congressional intent
to preclude state law is necessary.' There is also agreement that
this intent must be "clearly manifest;... "clearly manifest" intent
can be express or implied.' Few problems arise when Congress has
clearly expressed its purpose. A clear statement of intent by Con-
gress, however, is unusual. 9 More often than not, the intention of
Congress must be determined through judicial interpretation. The
Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp." outlined some
of the more important factors courts may consider in determining
whether congressional intent to preempt is to be implied: (i) the
pervasiveness of the federal regulation, (ii) the dominance of the
federal interest in the field of regulation and (iii) the objectives of
the federal regulation and whether non-federal regulation obstructs
the full execution of these aims.
The significance of established constitutional principles to the
regulation of air carriage is apparent. The exceedingly broad view
taken of interstate commerce by the Supreme Court could allow
the field of aeronautics to be regulated solely by the federal gov-
Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
23 Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 at 670
(9th Cir. 1972), afl'd, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
24Alta Dena Dairy v. San Diego Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1969).
1 Painter's Local Union No. 567 v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 398 P.2d 246
(Nev. 1965).
26Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
2 1 d. at 611.
28 C. ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
at 23 (1st ed. 1960).
29 Id.
30331 U.S. 218 (1947).
19731
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ernment. This result could come about by the courts reaching either
or both of two conclusions: (i) that national uniformity is needed
in the area or (ii) that, even though national uniformity is not
necessary, the existing federal enactments in the field have expressly
or impliedly preempted concurrent state regulation.
No court has found that the characteristics of commercial avia-
tion are such that uniformity is necessary in all areas of regulation;
therefore, if federal regulation is to be found to be exclusive, it
will probably be through congressional intent expressed in existing
federal legislation.
B. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Current federal legislation in the field of air law is dominated by
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.81 This Act repealed the previous
federal law on the subject, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.2
The 1938 Act created a comprehensive scheme for the regulation
of both the economic and safety aspects of air carriage under the
auspices of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The 1958 Act re-
enacted most of the provisions of its predecessor, the primary
objective of the new Act being to create a new administrative body,
the Federal Aviation Agency, that was to regulate air safety.33 The
economic provisions of the 1938 Act were reenacted virtually with-
out substantive change." The Civil Aeronautics Authority, now the
Civil Aeronautics Board, was to continue its function of regulating
air carrier economics under the new system. Since the 1938 and
1958 Acts are so similar, especially in regard to economic regula-
tion, it may be concluded that the intent of Congress expressed in
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 will still be relevant in analyzing
the present scheme of federal regulation.
The main stimulus for the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 was the chronic economic condition then existent
among the air carriers, a condition that Congress attributed to cut-
throat competition. It was widely believed that this lack of eco-
nomic stability adversely affected the level of safety in the industry
as well.' Congress viewed the existing federal legislation in the field
3149 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1970).
252 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. c. 9 (1948).
83S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1958).
'41d. at 2, 9; H. R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1958).
*S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H. R. REP. No. 2254, 75th
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as being inadequate to meet the problem.' The solution, as Con-
gress saw it, was to concentrate in one definitive agency the regu-
lation of air carriage. A House Report on the 1938 Act observed:
To divide them [the regulatory powers] among separate agencies
would be extremely costly and would lead to inefficiency and du-
plication of effort."
Similarly, the primary stimulus for the enactment of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 was the undesirable state into which the
quality of safety regulation of aeronautics had fallen.' Again, Con-
gress found that the reason for the condition was:
... because responsibility for its [safety regulation] planning has
until quite recently been scattered among a plethora of inter-agency
committees and boards instead of being concentrated in one over-
all authority.39
Congress concluded, as it had in 1938, that the characteristics of
aeronautics demand a single regulatory body with uniform stand-
ards to efficiently minister to the needs of the air transport industry.
Although it is apparent that Congress desired a system of uni-
form regulation of air carriage within the agencies of the federal
government, little mention is made of the federal government's
relationship to the states in either of the federal aviation acts or
their legislative histories. The statements that are made are con-
fused and conflicting on this point. For instance, a Senate report
on the 1938 Act stated:
The recognized and accepted principles of the regulation of pub-
lic utilities, as applied to other forms of transportation, have been
incorporated in S. 3845."'
This statement implies that the states were to assume the same de-
gree of control over the operations of air carriers as they enjoyed
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H. R. REP. No. 2635, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). See
also Westwood and Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW 309 (1967).
"The Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. § 177 (1934) was
the predecessor to the 1938 Act.
3"H. R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 4 (1938).
3"S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H. R. REP. No. 2360, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
39S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1958).
40S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 2 (1938).
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over surface carriers. Certainly, the states exercised considerable
authority over railroads, motor carriers and water carriers under
the Interstate Commerce Act." The same Senate report, however,
notes that "[t]he legislation is adopted to the special characteristics
of transporation by air ... ."" This statement does not indicate
that the Civil Aeronautics Act should be interpreted as analogous
to the Interstate Commerce Act in regard to the concurrent power
of the states. A House report on the 1938 Act stated that the prob-
lems of regulating air transport were "unique" because the policy
of the Air Commerce Act of 1926' was designed not merely to
regulate the operation of interstate air carriage, but was also to
regulate the design and manufacture of aircraft, the qualifications
for pilots, the air-traffic rules and the construction of airways, air-
ports and other navigational facilities." Thus, the extraordinary
concern and involvement of the federal government in the past
was seen as an important factor to be considered in any future
legislation. The same House report also recommended that these
differences in the degree of authority exerted by the federal gov-
ernment over aeronautics as compared to other modes of trans-
portation be evident in the new Act.' The opinion that the air
transport industry bears a "unique" and extremely close relation-
ship to the federal government is also apparent in the legislative
history of the 1958 Act.' Although the statements of Congress are
In People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723 at 737
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954), the California Supreme Court noted:
It is true, as defendant points out, that Congress did not use lan-
guage in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, such as that employed in
different legislation asserting its control over other kinds of common
carriers in which it was expressly stated that such regulations shall
not be construed to interfere with the exclusive exercise by each
state of the power to regulate intrastate commerce. See Section 1
(2), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § I (railroads); §
202 (b), Part II, Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 302
(motor carriers); § 303 (j), Part III, 49 U.S.C.A. § 903 (water
carriers).
42S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 2 (1938).
4344 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. § 177 (1934).
4H. R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 4 (1938).
45 Id.
"S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1958). The Supreme Court
is entirely in accord with the congressional purposes of creating uniformity of
regulation in an industry that bears a special relationship to federal authority.
In Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948) the Court said at page 107:
We find no indication that the Congress either entertained or fos-
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not without equivocation, the better view is that aeronautics should
not be regarded, for regulatory purposes, as a surface carrier, but
will be subjected to a greater degree of federal control.
Statements made in the 1938 and 1958 Acts themselves tend, at
least superficially, to add clarity to the scope of federal regulation.
Both Acts divide the regulatory role of the federal government into
two broad parts: (i) economic controls"" and (ii) safety controls.'
The Civil Aeronautics Board's economic regulatory powers are
limited to "air transportation." 9 This term is described in both
Acts as "interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation or the
transportation of mail by aircraft. ' This definition is not sig-
nificant in itself, but is in contrast to the limitation placed on fed-
eral control over air safety. In the field of safety regulation, the
Federal Aviation Agency may extend its power over "air com-
merce" which is defined as:
... interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or the transpor-
tation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft
within the limits of any federal airway or any operation or navi-
gation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger
safety in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce."'
The important distinction lies in the fact that federal economic
regulation may extend only to interstate, overseas or foreign com-
merce, while safety regulation extends beyond this to operations
that "directly affect" interstate commerce. Since Congress made
tered the narrow concept that airborne commerce is a mere out-
growth or overgrowth of surface bound transport. Of course, air
transportation, water transportation, rail transportation and motor
transportation all have a kinship in that all are forms of transporta-
tion and their common features of public carriage for hire may be
amenable to kindred regulations. But these resemblances must not
blind us to the fact that legally, as well as literally, air commerce,
whether at home or abroad, soared into a different realm than any
that had gone before .... A way of travel which quickly escapes
the bounds of local regulative competence called for a more pene-
trating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the nation than there
had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled com-
merce of the past.
41 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (a); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (a).
11 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a).
41 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (a); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (a).
*0 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 1301 (10); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. 51301 (10).
51 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 1421 (a).
12 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (4); 1938 Act, 49 U.S.C. 51301 (3).
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the distinction, it can be assumed that the federal government was
intended to have a different scope of authority in each field. It
may further be assumed that since Congress chose to extend fed-
eral authority over those things that "directly affect" air safety,
Congress intended there to be more extensive regulation in that
field than in economic regulation. How much more extensive is
unclear. Congress did not spell out what "affects" the Federal Avia-
tion Agency could legitimately regulate in the name of air safety.
Also, the fact that those facets of air carriage that affect interstate
commerce are not included within the definition of "air transporta-
tion" does not necessarily mean that federal economic controls could
never be exerted over those things that economically affect inter-
state commerce by judicial interpretation. Certainly, current judi-
cial opinion includes things affecting interestate commerce as being
regulatable by CongressY Other sections of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 that are frequently cited as pertaining to the issue of
state versus federal control of air carriage do not reveal a con-
sistent pattern.'
4
As ambiguous as Congress' position is regarding the extent of
federal regulation in the field of aeronautics, some congressional
intentions can be ascertained: (i) some degree of unified regulation
is necessary in both the economic and safety areas; (ii) Congress
regards the air transport industry in a different light than it
does other forms of transportation; and (iii) although Congress
intended that federal authority be extensive, some state regulation,
especially in the field of economics, was also contemplated.
Since Congress failed to expressly delineate the line between state
and federal regulation in the field of air carriage, judicial and
See supra notes 13-15 and text accompanying.
', According to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the United States "is de-
clared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the
airspace of the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (a) (1970). Each citizen of the
United States is granted the "right of freedom of transit through the navigable
airspace of the United States." 49 U.S.C. S 1304 (1970). "Navigable airspace" is
defined as all "airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regu-
lations issued under this chapter, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety
in take-off and landing of aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1970). These sections
indicate possible federal preemption. Other sections, however, indicate state par-
ticipation in the regulation of aeronautics. Section 1324 (b) of the Act recognizes
the existence of state aeronautics agencies and demands federal cooperation with
them. The savings clause in section 1506 is also frequently cited as recognizing
state participation.
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quasi-judicial' extrapolation on the subject must be analyzed. The
courts that have reviewed jurisdictional issues involving federal
aviation legislation have tended to follow Congress' lead and have
divided the cases into those pertaining primarily to safety and those
involving economic issues.
II. AIRSPACE CONTROL, THE TREND TOWARD PREEMPTION
A. Air Safety
Before the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was enacted, a great
deal of confusion existed regarding the extent of federal regulation
of safety in aeronautics. One of the earliest decisions on the matter,
Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.," indicated that the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 controlled both interstate and intra-
state air navigation. The federal district court in Neiswonger found
that "the circumstances and conditions under which air commerce
is carried on'"" necessitated a unified system of regulation." The
need for uniformity in the regulation of safety in aeronautics was
also noted in another federal district court decision, Swetland v.
Curtiss Airports Corp."' The court in Swetland feared that effective
regulation by the federal government under the 1926 Act would
be made exceedingly difficult if the states were allowed to adopt
different regulations for intrastate air traffic. Since all aircraft, inter-
state and intrastate, use the same airways and facilities, concurrent
authority over the aircraft using them was not feasible.
The desire for uniform regulation under the auspices of the fed-
eral government was not shared by many state courts. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, for instance, in Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co." held that the federal government could only regulate
interstate commerce, and that the police powers of the states en-
titled them to create air safety rules for entirely intrastate air traf-fic. 61
5 The Civil Aeronautics Board is a quasi-judicial body.
.-6 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
5
7 Id. at 763.
"'See Vol. 67, Part 9 Cong. Rec. 9390 (1926).
9 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930).
00270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
" See Parker v. Granger, 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P.2d 226, cert. denied, 298 U.S.
644 (1935); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works,
289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935).
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A great deal of this conflict of opinion was laid to rest after the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was enacted. Under this Act, the
federal government could promulgate safety regulations over "air
commerce" which was defined by Congress to include any opera-
tion that "directly affects" or that "may endanger safety" in inter-
state commerce. This definition made it possible for the courts to
extend federal jurisdiction beyond the limits of purely interstate
air commerce.
A more exact indication of the scope of federal authority in
regulating air safety was made by the Tenth Circuit in Rosenhan
v. United States." In this case, defendant-pilot was operating an
aircraft wholly within the state of Utah. Defendant's aircraft had
been issued a certificate of airworthiness by the Utah State Aero-
nautics Commission, but had failed to procure one from the fed-
eral government. Defendant alleged that since his operations were
entirely intrastate, he could not be regulated by the federal author-
ities. The court in Rosenhan found that the congressional grant of
authority in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 included the power
to regulate intrastate flights on federal airways. Two years later in
United States v. Drumm, the Federal District Court for Nevada
further broadened the scope of the federal government's power to
regulate air safety." At this issue in Drumm were two flights made
by defendant; one interstate, the other intrastate, between points
within California. Defendant did not have a federally issued pilot's
license or an airworthiness certificate for his aircraft. He claimed
he was not subject to Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations be-
cause he did not use CAA facilities and stayed away from CAA
airports and off federal airways. The court in Drumm, however,
found that "any operation of any aircraft in the airspace ... either
directly affects, or may endanger safety in interstate, overseas, or
foreign commerce. ...""
The Rosenhan and Drumm decisions established that Congress,
in the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, impliedly intended to exert its
broad power to protect interstate commerce over air navagation
occurring entirely within a state, whether or not federal facilities
were involved. Problems still remained, however, since neither
62 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942).
63 55 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944).
64 Id. at 155.
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court indicated whether this exertion of federal power excluded the
states from concurrently regulating safety in intrastate air opera-
tions.
Until the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, many
state courts were able to establish a role for state regulation of air
safety." Significant local authority over air safety ended with the
passage of the 1958 Act. Congress realized that the nature of air
carriage demanded uniform, consistent rules of operation;"6 the
major purpose of the 1958 Act therefore was to unify the decen-
tralized efforts of the federal government in providing safety."7
The courts have generally construed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 as allowing only federal regulation of safety in air navigation.
For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Air Line
Pilots Association International v. Quesada6 stated:
The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress for the purpose
of centralizing in a single authority ...the power to frame rules
for the safe and efficient use of the nation's airspace."
A more recent decision by the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
whole tenor and purpose of the Act was to "create and enforce one
unified system of flight rules."'
It is apparent that, in the field of safety control, Congress and
the courts have excluded the states from any appreciable regulatory
role, i.e. the area has been preempted. Air carriage, as a mode of
transportation, by its nature, is most significant on an interstate and
international scale. What operations occur within a single state may
"directly affect" or "endanger safety" in interstate commerce.
Therefore, Congress exerted, to the fullest extent, its regulatory
powers under the interstate commerce clause.
"'See Strother v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 525, 211 P.2d
624 (1949); City of Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 La. 737, 33 So.2d 503 (1947);
Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W.2d 201 (1944). But see Linam v. Mur-
phy, 360 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W.2d 937 (1950) where a state court held that federal
safety regulations are applicable to both interstate and intrastate air carriage.
"S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H. R. REP. No. 2360, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H. R. REP. No. 2556, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
67 id.
68276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
69 Id. at 894.
70United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401 at 1404 (9th Cir. 1969).
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B. Environmental Protection
As the size and use of aircraft have increased, there has been a
corresponding increase in the adverse environmental factors, par-
ticulariy noise, created around airports. When state and local gov-
ernments began to try to abate the problem, the possibility of con-
flict with federal aviation legislation again arose. The field of safety
regulation is closely related to the field of environmental control as
it relates to aircraft. Both areas of law heavily involve regulation of
the use of the navigable airspace.
The traditional police powers of the states allow them to regulate
those things that affect the safety, health or welfare of the local pop-
ulation. The exercise of these police powers is a strong interest of
the states and federal legislation will not be deemed to have pre-
cluded their use unless there is a clear congressional intent to do so
pursuant to a legitimate congressional concern.' The California
Supreme Court in Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines,
Inc. "' found there was no federal preemption in the field of aircraft
noise control. In Loma Portal, a group of local residents sought to
enjoin the use of certain landing approaches by interstate air car-
iers because the flights were excessively noisy and potentially
dangerous. When defendant-carriers claimed that a local court
could not interfere with their flights because the area of law was
preempted, the California Supreme Court noted: (i) nowhere in
the relevant federal legislation had Congress exhibited an express
desire to exclude concurrent state control; (ii) the states were pres-
ently allowed to participate in the regulation of several areas of
aeronautics; and (iii) the United States Supreme Court had never
found any implied intent on the part of Congress to exclude the
states from this area of traditional state control.73 In a more recent
case, William v. Arizona Superior Court,'4 the Arizona Supreme
Court reached a similar conclusion under a similar fact situation.
The Arizona court conceded that the federal government had pre-
71See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Loma Portal
Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394
P.2d 548 (1964) for discussions of state police powers.
7261 Cal. 2d 582, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964).
"See Stagg v. Municipal Court of Santa Monica Judicial Dist., 2 Cal. App.3d
318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969); Township of Hanover v. The Town of Morris-
town, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
74494 P.2d 26 (Ariz. 1972).
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enupted safety regulation, but it held that this preemption did not
necessarily extend to regulation in the area of noise control. The
court in Williams concluded that since federal regulation in this
field was not pervasive, consistent or non-conflicting local regula-
tion is not precluded."5
The federal courts that have reviewed attempts by local govern-
ments to regulate aircraft pollution have reached conclusions di-
rectly opposed to the state courts. The majority of the federal courts
have recognized that local governments may exercise their police
powers, but these courts have also observed that the exercise of the
police powers may not extend into a field of dominant federal inter-
est, i.e. the regulation of the "navigable airspace. '"" Any local
efforts to abate noise that involve an alteration of the altitudes or
the times at which aircraft may operate, the places over which air-
craft may fly or the equipment they may or may not use will neces-
sarily affect the comprehensive body of regulations the Federal
Aviation Agency has created to control the navigable airspace. The
federal district court in City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc."
took note of the problems that would arise if local pollution con-
trols were instituted:
If the courts undertook, by judicial decree, to promulgate regula-
tions and establish flight patterns peculiarly applicable to each
major airport .. .the uniformity contemplated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act and essential to a comprehensive regulatory system
would soon be impaired. The entire development of the air trans-
portation system would be hampered by a myriad of judicially pre-
scribed regulations of only local application."8
The fear of the results of locally inconsistent regulation was also
voiced by the district court in American Airlines, Inc. v. The Town
' See Parachutes, Inc. v. Township of Lakewood, 121 N.J. Super. 48, 296
A.2d 71 (1972); Thomson Industries, Inc. v. Village of Port Washington North,
10 Av. Cas. 17,655 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1968).
"0 United States v. City of New Haven, 447 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1971); American
Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 407 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1969); Alle-
gheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956). Some state
courts have also found federal preemption in the field; see Air Transport Assoc.
of America v. City of Inglewood, 12 Avi. L. REP. 17,818 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1972);
Opinion of The Justices, 271 N.E.2d 354 (Mass. 1971).
'7 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958).
7 81d. at 758.
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of Hempstead."9 The court in Hempstead went on to note that the
pervasive regulation of safety in aeronautics necessarily carries over
into the regulation of environmental problems created by aircraft:
The actual exercise by the Congress of the power to regulate in
this field is so pervasive as to preclude valid enactment of the
Hempstead Ordinance. It would be difficult to visualize a more
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation, subsidization and op-
eration participation than that which Congress has provided in the
field of aviation."
This "comprehensive scheme of federal regulation"e was intensified
in 1972 by an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act that gave
the administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency special regula-
tory powers over aviation pollution problems.8
In a recent decision, Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. The City
of Burbank," the Supreme Court flatly stated that Congress had pre-
empted control over aircraft-inspired pollution problems, thus re-
solving the previously existing federal-state conflict on the matter.
Involved in the Lockheed case was a city ordinance that forbade
pure jet aircraft from taking off or landing at the Hollywood-Bur-
bank Airport between the hours of eleven p.m. and seven a.m. The
Court found that the intent of Congress to exclude such local regu-
lation could be implied from the two factors emphasized in the
Newark and Hempstead cases: (i) the pervasiveness of federal reg-
ulation in the area, and (ii) the obstruction of the uniform air-
space management demanded by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
The trend in the judicial interpretation of federal legislation in
the use of airspace is strongly toward exclusivity of federal control.
Federal environmental protection measures bear only an indirect
relation to air safety, yet the area has been preempted. It is appar-
ent that any regulation directly or indirectly affecting safety in "air-
commerce" must originate with the federal government, whether
the regulated activity is interstate or entirely intrastate in nature.
19272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
80272 F. Supp. at 232.
81 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1972). The Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234
amends section 1431 of the Federal Aviation Act. This amendment involves the
Environmental Protection Agency in the scheme of federal control of aircraft
noise.




The pervasiveness of federal authority in the fields of air safety
and the use of airspace may also touch upon the field of economic
regulation. The relationship between the two fields is illustrated by
the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.83 One
of the primary reasons Congress was so concerned with the lack of
economic stability in the air transport industry was because it was
believed that economic adversity initiated cutbacks in areas affect-
ing safety. The same point is illustrated by the facts existing in the
Lockheed Air Terminal case. The Supreme Court found federal
preemption in Lockheed Air Terminal largely because of the dom-
inant federal regulation of the use of airspace. Integrally wound up
in airspace management is the scheduling and routing of commer-
cial air carrier flights which are economic regulatory features. The
Burbank ordinance prohibited pure jet take-offs or landings be-
tween eleven p.m. and seven a.m.; the impact of this local regula-
tion fell upon the schedules of air carriers as well as upon federal
pollution measures. Every court reviewing the permissibility of the
ordinance, including the Supreme Court, expressed concern that
locally inconsistent regulation would obstruct the federal goals of
national uniformity." Since the Civil Aeronautics Board' and the
Federal Aviation Agency"6 are required to create a degree of na-
tional uniformity in their respective areas of expertise, the question
arises whether the scope of federal authority in each area can logic-
ally be separated if the congressional objectives are to be met."'
"See supra note 35 and text accompanying.
" 318 F. Supp. 914 (D. Cal. 1970); 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972); 411 U.S.
624 (1973).
6549 U.S.C. §S 1302-1387 (1970).
8649 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1443 (1970).
6 The fact that a great deal of federal exclusivity exists in the field of air-
space use does not mean that state courts cannot grant monetary remedies to par-
ties injured by aircraft noise pollution. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 257 (1945) established that the burden placed upon a prop-
erty's use by low and noisy overflights was a compensable "taking" under the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Av. CAS.
17,642 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970), the California Superior Court acknowledged that
the federal government had preempted control of the "navigable airspace;" how-
ever, this does not preclude a finding by a state court that there has been a taking
of private property. Merely because the federal government creates regulations
allowing aircraft to fly inordinately low over plaintiff's property in the course
of landing, does not mean the state cannot provide a remedy. The position of the
19731
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Congress has, in certain areas, exercised its full power over inter-
state commerce in the economic realm. It was established by the
federal district court for New Jersey in In Re Veteran's Air Ex-
press Co.8 that Congress has completely preempted control of the
registration and conveyancing of interests in aircraft, an area hav-
ing predominate economic characteristics. It was found that the
comprehensive federal law on the subject covers any interest in any
aircraft, even if used entirely within one state." A state recorded
lien, for instance, provides no notice to later creditors and is
ineffective against a lien recorded under federal law." This per-
vasive federal concern, however, is not evident in all areas of
economic regulation. Other areas are subject to varying degrees of
concurrent state control.
A. Taxation
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota," Justice Jackson, con-
California Superior Court in Aaron is consistent with an earlier United States
Supreme Court decision, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). In
Griggs, plaintiff was able to recover damages against a local airport in a state
court, even though the low flying aircraft causing plaintiff's injury were within
the federally prescribed minimum altitude (the state supreme court decision was
overturned by the United States Supreme Court decision, but not on this point).
See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961). Similarly,
other aviation related torts occurring within a state may be remedied by that
state's courts. See Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Thorn-
burg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966) where plaintiffs re-
covered for damages due to noisy overflights. See also Southeastern Aviation, Inc.
v. Hurd, 355 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1962) where plaintiff was allowed to recover
on a wrongful death theory for a tort having an aviation origin. Accord, Porter
v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); McEntire
v. Estate of Forte, 463 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (state guest statute
applied). In Philco Corp. v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 171 N.W.2d 16 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1969) the reviewing court found that plaintiff could rescind a contract
dealing with aviation. See Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d
1389 (5th Cir. 1970); federal law has not preempted the law of bailment as it
applies to aircraft.
"8 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948). Accord, Pacific Financial Corp. v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 296 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. United Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948); Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537,
51 S.E.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1949); Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank &
Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. 1963).
"
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406 (1972).
10In Re Veterans Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D. N.J. 1948). It should
also be noted that any air carrier transporting United States mail will be under
federal jurisdiction. See Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Commerce By the
States, 31 VA. L. REV. 479, at 520 (1945). Federal interest in and regulation of
the carriage of mail is extremely intensive. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1376 (1970).
91 322 U.S. 292 (1943).
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curring in the majority opinion, ably expressed the prevailing atti-
tude toward state taxation of the air transport industry:
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating
air commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes
do not wander about the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only
by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands
of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of
federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway, it is
caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes
off only by instruction from the control tower, it travels on pre-
scribed beams, it may be diverted from its intended landing, and
it obeys signals and orders. Its privileges, rights and protection, so
far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone
and not to any state.
Congress has not extended its protection and control to the field
of taxation, although I take it no one denies that constitutionally
it may do so."
The anomaly created by this reasoning is apparent. On the one
hand, the area of safety regulation, which is characterized by an
intensive federal concern and desire for uniformity, is dominated
by a system of federal law that cannot tolerate concurrent state
regulation; on the other hand, the area of economic regulation,
also characterized by an intensive federal interest and desire for
uniformity, allows concurrent local regulation in the form of taxa-
tion.9
3
Neither the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 nor its predecessors
made provision for a nationally uniform system of taxation. As a
result, the states have very liberal taxing powers over commercial
aeronautics. It has never seriously been doubted that a carrier en-
gaged in intrastate operations may be taxed by the state in which
it operates.' Apparently, the states can also tax interstate air car-
riers. In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equali-
zation and Assessment,' Nebraska levied an ad valorem tax on
the interstate carrier's equipment. Assertions by Braniff that the
state taxation was a burden on interstate commerce and that exist-
92 Id. at 303.
9See Arditto, State and Local Taxation o1 Scheduled Local Airlines, 16 J.
Aitt L. & Com. 162 (1949).
' See Opinion of the Justices re House Bill No. 435, 6 Av. Cas. 17,429 (N.H.
1959).
-347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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ing federal aviation legislation was preemptive in the field of taxa-
tion were unsuccessful."6
The states' powers in the field of taxation are clearly the most
extensive form of regulation the states enjoy in the entire field of
air law. There appears to be little difference, as far as taxation
goes, between air transport and surface transport. Uniformity, in
this area, has not been thought to be necessary or desirable. The
primary reason for this is the belief that interstate air carriers must
pay their own way for the facilities, legal protections and markets
the states provide. To allow the interstate carriers to escape local
taxation would burden the resources of the states and would put
the intrastate operators, which can be taxed by the states, at a dis-
advantage.97
Even though the states enjoy extensive taxing authority over
interstate air carriers, the commerce clause is an important limiting
factor on these powers. It is generally recognized that interstate
air commerce may be burdened to some extent by local taxation.
This, however, is acceptable only as long as the local tax is not
discriminatory or multiple in effect and bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the services provided by the locality." To do this, an
adequate apportionment formula must be derived; i.e., if a carrier
operates within several states, no single state may assess a tax on
that carrier's property beyond a specified fraction of the property's
value proportionate to the use occurring within the state. In Flying
Tiger Line v. County of Los Angeles,9 the local government sought
to assess an ad valorem tax on one hundred per cent of the value
of the interstate carrier's property. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia found the tax unconstitutional in view of the possibility of mul-
96 The same defenses were raised and defeated in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
The State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1943). In a more recent Supreme Court
case, Evansville-Vanderburg Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405
U.S. 707 (1972), the local tax was struck down; the Court, however, did not
accept the argument that the federal government had preempted the field.
"See Evansville-Vanderburg Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405
U.S. 707 (1972); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City and County of San Francis-
-co, 228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956); United
Airlines, Inc. v. Porterfield, 28 Ohio St.2d 97, 276 N.E.2d 629 (1971); American
Airlines, Inc. v. Battle, 181 Va. 1, 23 S.E.2d 796 (1943).
11 Evansville-Vanderburg Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972); United Airlines, Inc. v. Porterfield, 28 Ohio St.2d 97, 276 N.E.2d
629 (1971).
99 333 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
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tiple taxation. If other states assessed a similar tax on Flying Tiger,
even on an apportioned basis, the cumulative tax would be in ex-
cess of the total value of the property. The Supreme Court in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State of Minnesota. allowed Minnesota
to assess an ad valorem tax on one hundred per cent of Northwest
Airlines' fleet. The Court found that the special relationship be-
tween an interstate carrier and its domicile and home port, which
was in this case Minnesota, allowed the tax. Beyond this exception,
however, the apportionment rule will be applied.
A second important limitation placed on local taxation of inter-
state air carriage is that only certain events are appropriately tax-
able by local governments. Otherwise, the tax will be struck down
as bearing too directly on interstate commerce. In a recent Supreme
Court case, United Airlines, Inc. v. Mahin,"' an Illinois use tax
on the storage and withdrawal from storage of aviation fuel was
found to be constitutional. The events taxed took place entirely
within the state of Illinois. The fact that the ultimate function of
the stored and later withdrawn fuel was to provide motive power
for carrying on interstate commerce, the Court reasoned, was not
such a direct burden on interstate commerce that the tax could not
be sustained.' 2 Other appropriate events for state taxation on in-
terstate air carriage include: the sale of aviation fuels'2 and meals
for consumption on interstate flights;"' ad valorem taxes on prop-
erty owned, stored, possessed or used within the state;"' franchise
taxes on the privilege of doing business within the state;"' and taxes
100322 U.S. 292 (1944).
101410 U.S. 623 (1973).
102 See Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933); American
Airways, Inc. v. Wallace, 57 F.2d 877 (D. Tenn. 1932); American Airlines, Inc.
v. Battle, 181 Va. 1, 23 S.E.2d 796 (1943).
"0'Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 285 U.S. 147
(1932); Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc. v. Lujan, 36 N.M. 64, 8 P.2d 103
(1931).
104 Undercofler v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 147 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 1966).
"' American Airlines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 30 Cal. Rptr. 590
(Cal. App. 1963); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 320
P.2d 552 (Cal. App. 1958); Slick Airways Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 104
Cal. App.2d 311, 295 P.2d 46 (Cal. App. 1956); Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Heckers,
499 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1972); Mid-Continent Air Lines, Inc. v. Neb. State
Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 157 Neb. 425, 59 N.W.2d 746 (1953); Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. Missouri State Tax Com'n, 378 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1964); The
Vector Co., Inc. v. Benson, 491 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. 1973).
200 United Air Lines, Inc. v. State of Michigan, 185 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. App.
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for the use of facilities within the state °'O
State or local taxes that bear too directly on interstate commerce
will not be upheld. An air carrier must have a sufficient intrastate
contact before a state can levy a tax on it."' In United States Air-
ways, Inc. v. Shaw,'" the state of Oklahoma sought to levy an
excise tax on all gasoline consumed in the state. This tax was found
to fall directly on the use of an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, and was therefore found to be unconstitutional."' Likewise,
an interstate air carrier with no significant intrastate business is
immune from local franchise taxes."'
Most local taxes on interstate air carriers will be sustained if a
reasonable apportionment scheme is created and there is a sufficient
intrastate nexus with the property or privilege taxed. The burden
on the interstate air transport industry is obvious. Since there is no
uniform scheme of taxation, no two states will necessarily have the
same system of apportioning taxes; neither will the taxable events
be the same. Under this system, or the lack thereof, the possibility
of multiple taxes, complexity and confusion are great."1 ' Also, in-
consistent local taxation can interfere with the Civil Aeronautics
Board's rate structure.
Problems similar to those mentioned above led Congress to pre-
empt state taxation of interstate air carrier passengers. In a recent
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress said:
No state ... shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce
or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the
1970); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Porterfield, 28 Ohio St.2d 97, 276 N.E.2d 629
(1971); American Air Lines, Inc. v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 272, 257 N.E.2d
348 (1970).
107 Trans World Air Lines, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 228
F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956); Kucharski v. Trans
World Air Lines, Inc., 251 N.E.2d 225 (Ill. 1969); People v. American Airlines,
Inc., 233 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. 1967).
11 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
109 43 F.2d 148 (W.D. Okla. 1930). Accord, Mid-Continent Air Express Corp.
v. Lujan, 47 F.2d 266 (D. N.M. 1931).
10See Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
"I Spector Motor Service v. O'Conner, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Joseph, 121 N.Y.S.2d 692 (N.Y. Sup. 1953).
.. See Developments In the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of
Interstate Business, 75 HARvARD L. REV. 953 (1962).
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sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived there-
from .... "'
The litigation that preceded the enactment of this law illustrates the
confusion and burden locally inconsistent taxation can have on the
air carrier industry." ' In enacting the recent amendment, Congress
recognized the need for a uniform system of taxation in one area,"".
yet other forms of local taxation were specifically exempted."' How
Congress might act in the future is therefore not clear. The prob-
lem, however, has been recognized. Since both "air commerce" and
"air transportation" are used in this statute, it may be concluded
that Congress has recognized that activities entirely within the
states may have adverse economic effects on the national air tran-
sport system."'
B. Routes, Service, Rates and Certificates
The extensive authority state and local governments have over
air carriage in the field of taxation is more limited in other areas
of economic regulation. The principle reason for this lessening of
state regulation is the extensive federal legislation in the area. The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 speaks directly to the regulation of
the routes air carriers will use, the services they will provide and
the rates they will charge, as well as the procedures and qualifica-
tions for certification, and the business practices and relationships
the carriers will be allowed to engage in." ' This extensive scheme
of federal legislation and the regulations promulgated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board pursuant to the Act exhibit a strong federal
interest in this field of law. In spite of the degree of federal interest
"'Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 7 (June 18, 1973), 87 Stat. 90, (amending Title XI,
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, adding § 1113).
1" Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S.
707 (1972); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Board, 463
P.2d 470 (Mont. 1970); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. New Hampshire Aeronautics
Comm'n, 273 A.2d 676 (N.H. 1971); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Phila-
delphia, 12 Avi. L. REP. 17,505 (Pa. Corn. Pls. Ct. 1972), appeal dismissed, 299
A.2d 693 (Pa. Com. St. 1973).
"'See 119 CONG. REc. S2089-2090 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1973).
156 Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 7(b) (June 18, 1973), 87 Stat. 90 (amending Title
XI, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, adding § 1113(b)).
"" See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 12 Avi. L. REP. 18,060
(Pa. S. Ct. 1973). This is the first case to interpret the new congressional legisla-
tion. The court found this field of law to be preempted.
11849 U.S.C. §5 1371-1387 (1970).
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in regulating the economic aspects of air carriage, neither the CAB
nor the courts have been willing to find federal preemption in this
area as they were able to do in the area of safety regulation. The
reasons for this phenomenon are two: (i) specific statutory lan-
guage in the Federal Aviation Act limits federal jurisdiction in
dealing with economic factors and (ii) what is conceived by the
CAB and the courts to be in the public interest.
1. Intrastate Carriers
The authority of the states over air carrier economics is most
clearly established in the regulation of carriers that limit their op-
erations to a single state. A recent decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Texas International Airlines, Inc.
v. Civil Aeronautics Board,"9 illustrates the statutory limitations
placed on federal authority in the field of economic regulation. In
Texas International, two interstate-CAB certificated carriers, Bra-
niff and Texas International, asked the Civil Aeronautics Board to
investigate an intrastate-state certificated carrier, Air Southwest,
to determine whether federal jurisdiction should be placed upon
the state carrier. The interstate carriers asserted that the competi-
tion and resulting diversion caused by Air Southwest affected the
operations of the CAB regulated carriers and that therefore the
Civil Aeronautics Board ought to regulate the state carrier. The
theory advanced by the interstate carriers would have extended
federal authority in the field of economic regulation to the con-
stitutional maximum and virtually preempted concurrent state reg-
ulation as had been done in the area of safety regulation. The cir-
cuit court, however, refused to adopt the interstate carriers' theory
and emphatically endorsed the position that the distinction between
the definitions of "air transportation""' and "air commerce"'' in
the Federal Aviation Act was deliberately made by Congress. Since
the definition of "air commerce," which describes federal authority
in regulating safety, includes the "affects" on interstate commerce
and thus extends federal power to its constitutional limit, it must
be assumed the definition of "air transportation," which describes
federal authority in economic regulation, does not include the "af-
fects" on interstate commerce. Therefore, the court in Texas Inter-
119 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12049 U.S.C. 5 1301(10) (1970).
12149 U.S.C. 51301(4) (1970).
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national reasoned that Congress did not intend to extend federal
authority to the full constitutional limits under the commerce clause
and that there is some room for state regulation. The opinion of
the circuit court in the Texas International case has been consist-
ently supported by the Civil Aeronautics Board" and the majority
of courts reviewing the issue."'
Although the statutory limitation in the Federal Aviation Act
is undoubtedly the primary reason why the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the courts have chosen not to extend federal power in the eco-
nomic area, a more subtle, but no less important reason should be
discussed. Any judicial body reviewing conduct pursuant to the
Federal Aviation Act must consider, as an important factor, the
public interest." Therefore, what is interpreted to be in the public
interest will have a great bearing on the reviewing body's ultimate
determination.' A former chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board has observed that state regulation and intrastate carriers are
beneficial to the public since these factors "have had a salutary
effect upon air travel" by way of improved service, lower fares and
" See Texas International Airlines, Inc. and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Air South-
west Co., CAB Dockets 23047, 23122, Order 71-6-79 at 6 (June 15, 1971); CAB
brief, Texas International Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"' See Dower v. United Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1964); People v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 268 P.2d 723 (Cal. 1954), appeal dismissed for want of
substantial federal question, 345 U.S. 859 (1954); Texas Aeronautics Commis-
sion v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), rev'd, 454
S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). When other issues
have been involved, the CAB and the courts have been willing to accord the terms
found in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 very liberal interpretations in con-
tradistinction to the narrow definition accorded the powers of the CAB. See Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). For ex-
ample, the term "air carrier" has been given a very broad definition. See Monarch
Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1972), noted in 39 J. Ant L. & COM. 463 (1973); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v.
CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (1962); Pacific Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 88 F. Supp. 592 (D. Alas. 1948).
'24See 49 U.S.C. 1302 (1970).
11 See C.A.B. v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950). This case discusses
the importance of the "public interest" as a factor in CAB decision-making. Pro-
motion of competition is usually in the public interest. See Airport Com'n of
Forsyth County v. C.A.B., 300 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1962); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. C.A.B., 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 184
F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in
United States Air Transportation, 24 J. AIR L. & COM. 410 (1957) and 25 J.
AIR L. & COM. 148 (1958); Richmond, Creating Competition Among Airlines,
24 J. Am L. & COM. 435 (1957).
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an increased volume of traffic." ' These salutary effects have been
largely the result of state certificated intrastate carriers competing
with established CAB regulated carriers. Certainly, this factor
weighed heavily upon the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Aeronau-
tics Commission v. Braniff Airways, Inc.'7 when the court approved
the TAC's certification of an intrastate carrier. The primary issue
in the Texas Aeronautics Commission case was whether, and to
what extent, the applicant-intrastate carrier could fulfill the pub-
lic interest by providing new and better service to Texas markets."'
The effects of intrastate carriers competing with interstate car-
riers on intrastate routes is not entirely positive. As asserted by the
interstate carriers in Texas International, intrastate competition
has diverted a significant amount of business away from the inter-
state carriers. The adverse effects this diversion can have on CAB
certificated carriers is illustrated by a recent Civil Aeronautics
Board order.' In this order, Pacific Airlines, an interstate carrier,
applied for an exemption so that it could take up additional mar-
kets to offset its losses on intra-California routes due to competition
from Pacific Southwest, an intrastate carrier. In granting the ex-
emption, the Board noted:
[T]he statutory criteria for exemption are met in this case. As pre-
viously detailed, Pacific is in the unique situation of being sub-
jected to strong competition by a carrier not subjected to federal
regulation, and Pacific's present difficulties with respect to its sys-
tem operations are attributable in substantial part to this compe-
tition. As a result, the balanced transportation system which we
have attempted to establish in California, with service to thin as
well as the dense traffic points, may be seriously impaired."'
Clearly, intrastate competition must not only be considered in light
of the public interest, but whether that competition interferes with
the aims and objectives of the Federal Aviation Act. At least one
"2 113 CONG. REc. 18299 (1967) (Letter by Chas. S. Murphy, Chmn., Civil
Aeronautics Board). See Note, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 607 (1966).
127 454 S.W.2d 199 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
"28 It should be noted that in Sosa v. Young Flying Service, Inc., 277 F. Supp.
554 (S.D. Tex. 1967) the Texas Aeronautics Act was found not to conflict with
federal law.
"9 CAB Order E-24590, Doc. 17527 (Dec. 30, 1966).
101d. at 5. See CAB Order 25483, Doc. 18713, 18759 (Aug. 7, 1967); CAB
Order 24895, Doc. 17528 (March 24, 1967); CAB Order 23957, Doc. 17527
(July 15, 1966), where the adverse effects of intrastate competition are noted.
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federal court has stated that this obstruction, especially when fed-
eral subsidies are involved, could lead to federal regulation."'
What the courts and the Civil Aeronautics Board will allow the
states to economically control as intrastate air traffic is very lim-
ited. Even though a carrier's operations may be entirely within the
boundaries of a state, it may be considered to be in interstate com-
merce if it transports a significant amount of interstate traffic. In
the case of Civil Aeronautics Board v. Friedkin Aeronautics, Inc.,3
the intrastate carrier concerned had made arrangements with inter-
state carriers to carry passengers coming into and leaving the state
of California. The transport of these interstate passengers, the
Ninth Circuit held, changed the character of the airlines' services
from intrastate to interstate.
Apparently, it is not even necessary that the carrier have knowl-
edge of the origin or destination of its passengers. The district court
reviewing the case of Civil Aeronautics Board v. Canadian Colonial
Airways, Inc.,"' found the intrastate operations of Canadian Colo-
nial to be subject to regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board. In
the Canadian Colonial case, the Board exerted its regulation over
a carrier operating only within New York, but which transported
passengers who were to ultimately take other means of transporta-
tion in leaving the state. The intrastate carrier in Canadian Colo-
nial was found to be operating in interstate commerce, even though
there was no evidence it was actually aware of the interstate charac-
ter of its clientele.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has said that the states may regu-
13 C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 1009 (D. Haw. 1964),
aft'd, 352 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1965):
Any substantial loss of revenue would materially increase the claims
of the two carriers for subsidy support by the CAB and would also
impair the ability of Aloha to repay its CAB guaranteed loans and
thus might require payment by the CAB.
It thus clearly appears that the impact of inter-island flights by
Island, with its low rates, would have a substantial effect upon in-
terstate air commerce, viz., it would apparently necessitate an in-
creased mail subsidy to the two presently certificated carriers,
Hawaiian and Aloha, and would put in jeopardy the repayment of
Aloha of its CAB-guaranteed loans. To deny CAB jurisdiction would
substantially interfere with the execution of aims and objectives of
the Act and would not be to the best interests of the United States
in the regulation of air transportation thereunder.
246 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1957).
t 41 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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late only "purely intrastate" air operations and that only a "de
minimis" amount of interstate traffic will be tolerated.'" The CAB
opinion on the subject indicates that intrastate carriers, if they wish
to avoid federal regulation, must not only avoid any ticketing or
other arrangements with connecting carriers, but must also make
special efforts to avoid carrying more than a de minimis amount of
interstate traffic. In a recent order of the Civil Aeronautics Board
involving an alleged intrastate air carrier operation in Florida, the
Board elaborated on the de minimis rule:
We note that Southeast represents that the proposed flights will be
confined wholly to the airspace over the state of Florida; that the
proposed operations will be conducted without any arrangements
with interstate carriers for joint, through-plane service; that the
service will not be advertised in out-of-state media; and that even
if some out-of-state visitors are carried there will be a break in the
journey of these passengers, between the flight from another state
to Florida and the flight on Southeast. If Southeast's operations are
in fact conducted in the foregoing manner, carrying no more than
a de minimis volume of interstate traffic . . . the flights will not
constitute air transportation subject to the Board's jurisdiction."
2. Interstate Carriers
The foregoing discussion would seem to indicate that the sphere
of state economic regulation of air carriage was quite limited-
only those operations entirely within a state, with no significant out
of state contacts, may escape CAB regulations. The stringent de
minimis rule would appear to exclude from state regulations any
activities of interstate carriers. This, however, is not the case. The
Supreme Court in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.' found that at least a part of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act's economic regulations are not preemptive, even
in regard to interstate, CAB certificated air carriers. In this case,
a Negro plaintiff alleged that Continental engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices in Colorado and asked the state commission to give
"' Applications of Southwest Airlines, Inc. and Air California, Inc., CAB
Order 71-8-57, Docs. 22680 and 22721 (Aug. 12, 1971); Texas International
Airlines, Inc. and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Air Southwest Co., CAB Order 71-6-79,
Docs. 23047 and 23122 (June 15, 1971).
1'5 Application of Southeast Airlines, Inc., CAB Order 70-7-57, Doc. 21864
at 3 (July 13, 1970). See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218
(1946); Southerland v. St. Croix Taxicab Assoc., 315 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1963).
16 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
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relief. The Supreme Court, in finding the Federal Aviation Act's
anti-discrimination provisions to be non-preemptive, stated:
Notwithstanding this broad authority [of the CAB and the FAA],
we are satisfied that Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
and its successor had no express or implied intent to bar state
legislation in this field .... 137
The "field" the Supreme Court referred to in Colorado Anti-Dis-
crimination Commission may readily be limited to the area of civil
rights and not construed to include the general field of economic
regulation of air carriage. There is evidence, however, that state
economic regulation of interstate carriers extends well beyond the
field of civil rights.
In February 1951, the Civil Aeronautics Board "urged" the in-
terstate carriers flying the Los Angeles-San Francisco route to raise
their fares by approximately three cents per mile. The request was
made so that the rates in this market would conform to the na-
tional air coach fare pattern. 8' Western Air Lines and California
Central Air Lines accordingly raised their rates. The California
Public Utilities Commission, however, challenged the legality of
the increase since the carriers had not first secured the PUC's
authorization as demanded in the state's constitution. 3' The CAB
regulated carriers retorted that economic regulation of interstate
air carriers was preempted by the Civil Aeronautics Act. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in People v. Western Air Lines, Inc."' re-
solved the issue in favor of the state public utilities commission.
The California court found that the Federal Aviation Act did not
require that interstate air carriers be treated differently than any
other type of common carrier, and that therefore the intrastate
operations of the air carriers could be regulated by the states. The
fares that the interstate carriers had instituted at the request of the
CAB were held to be illegal.
The Western Air Lines case has received broad support from
37 id. at 723-24.
1"8 See Taylor, Economic Regulation of Intrastate Air Carriers in California,
41 CALIF. L. REv. 454, 457 (1953).
1'm Calif. Const. Art. XII S§ 17, 20, 21, 22, 23.
140 268 P.2d 723 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial fed-
eral question, 345 U.S. 859 (1954).
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state' and federal courts" and even the CAB. 1"" The Supreme
Court has at least acquiesced in the opinion.'" It is also generally
recognized that the states may require interstate carriers to procure
a state license or certificate to operate on intrastate routes. A recent
survey by the National Air Transportation Conference indicates
that twenty-three states require some form of license be secured by
CAB certificated carriers before they can operate within the state."
In a recent brief filed by the Civil Aeronautics Board, this position
was taken:
The Board has never questioned the right of a state to require a
Board-certificated carrier to secure a state certification for the car-
riage of intrastate traffic between points . . .which are in that
state, and it may be that a state could deny such a certificate. . ..","
"" Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Texas Aeronautics Commission, 454 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
"2 Dower v. United Air Lines, Inc., 329 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1964).
143 113 CONG. REC. 18299 (1967). (Letter by Charles S. Murphy, Chmn.
CAB).
'"In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comn., 342 U.S. 908 (1952) and
later in People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 345 U.S. 859 (1954), the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on this issue. Regardless of the fact that it is generally
accepted that a denial of review is not to be construed as an opinion on the
merits, the Court's action does strengthen the hand of the states.
"2States requiring CAB certificated carriers to hold a state license or certifi-
cate: Alaska (Public Utilities Commission), Florida (Department of Transporta-
tion), Illinois (Commerce Commission), Nebraska (State Railroad Commission),
Nevada (Public Utility Commission), Pennsylvania (Public Utility Commission),
Vermont (Aviation Board), and Virginia (State Corporation Commission).
States requiring state approval of (interstate) commuter carrier operations be-
tween points within the state: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.
States requiring state approval of (interstate) commuter carrier passenger and
freight tariffs on operations between points within the state: Alabama (Public
Utilities Commission), Alaska (Transportation Commission), Arizona (Corpora-
tion Commission), Arkansas (Transportation Commission), California (Public
Utilities Commission), Colorado (Public Utilities Commission), Idaho (Public
Utilities Commission), Illinois (Commerce Commission), Florida (Department
of Transportation), Montana (Aeronautics Commission), Nebraska (State Rail-
road Commission), Nevada (Public Utilities Commission), North Dakota (Aero-
nautics Commission), Pennsylvania (Public Utilities Commission), Tennessee(Department of Transportation), Texas (Aeronautics Commission), Utah (Public
Service Commission), Vermont (Aeronautics Board), Virginia (State Corpora-
tion Commission), and Wyoming (Public Service Commission).
Source: November, 1971, survey by National Air Transportation Conference.
'.. CAB brief as Amicus Curiae, Texas v. Sedalia-Marshall-Boonville Stage
Line, Inc., No. 71-749 (Dist. Ct. Smith Co., Tex., Mar. 1, 1972).
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The position taken by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
courts regarding state regulation of rates and certification of inter-
state carriers operating over intrastate routes is consistent with those
cases finding that the federal economic powers are limited to true
interstate commerce. The distinction between the terms "air com-
merce" and "air transportation" as defined in the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 is always cited to support state regulation in those
two areas. The notion of the de minimis rule, however, is not con-
sistent. Certainly, a CAB certificated carrier will not seek to avoid
interline agreements that will ultimately take passengers out of
state; neither would these carriers seek to contain their advertising
and other operations within a single state. That the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board could regulate these intrastate fares and prohibit state
certification under the de minimis rule is obvious; why concurrent
and often conflicting state authority in these fields is allowed is not
clearly stated.
The confusion regarding state-federal relationships in the area
of the economic regulation of interstate air carriers is further
clouded by another recent decision, Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission." Allegheny Airlines
had been operating over an intra-Pennsylvania route between Har-
risburg and Williamsport pursuant to both CAB and Pensylvania
PUC certificates for over twenty years. Allegheny received CAB
approval to drop the Harrisburg-Williamsport route from its sched-
ule. The state PUC demanded that the carrier also get its permis-
sion before the cancellation took place. Although the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion abstains from deciding the merits of the case,"4 8 the
brief filed by the Civil Aeronautics Board is enlightening' 9 and
consistent with other statements made by the Board.'" In brief, the
CAB took the position that the areas of routes and scheduling of
interstate carriers is preempted by federal law. The Board asserted
147 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972).
148 Under the circumstances (Allegheny had allowed the state of Pennsylvania
to regulate it for over twenty years), the circuit court exercised its discretion to
abstain from deciding the merits so that a state-federal conflict could be avoided.
See also Bonanza Air Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Com'n of Nev., 186 F. Supp.
674 (D. Nev. 1960).
148 CAB brief as Amicus Curiae in Allegheny Air Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972).
"' See CAB brief as Amicus Curiae, Texas v. Sedalia-Marshall-Boonville Stage
Line, Inc., No. 71-749 (Dist. Ct. Smith Co., Tex., Mar. 1, 1972).
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that the economic regulatory sections of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 are a pervasive regulatory scheme and that concurrent
state requirements stand as obstacles "to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress .... ""'
The Board recognizes the problem of the definitional sections of the
Act, but overcomes it by stating:
To be sure, the Federal Aviation Act does not in terms extend to
intrastate air carriage nor preclude the states from regulating any
intrastate aspects of interstate air carrier's operations. But that is
only the starting point. Rather, the entire scheme of the [federal]
statute must ... be considered .... ,,152
The CAB's assertion is definitely based on an implied preemption
theory: although Congress did not expressly intend to exclude
concurrent state regulation in the area, an objective analysis of the
entire regulatory scheme and the congressional objectives notes the
necessity of preemption. Since the CAB is charged with "[t]he de-
velopment of a national air-transportation system properly adapted
to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States . . . ""' obstacles created by a single
state to the national system must be eliminated.
The Board substantiates its assertion that Congress has implied-
ly preempted this field of economic regulation with the "intertwine-
ment" theory advanced by the Supreme Court in Colorado v. Unit-
ed States," and as applied to the Federal Aviation Act by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Frontier Air Lines, Inc. v. Nebraska De-
partment of Aeronautics.' The facts in Colorado v. United States
were very similar to those existing in the Allegheny Air Lines case.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has granted the petition of
an interstate rail carrier to abandon an intra-Colorado segment.
The state disputed the ability of the Commission to authorize the
action. Although the Interstate Commerce Commission's authority
'5 CAB brief as Amicus Curiae in Allegheny Air Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Com'n, 465 F.2d 237 at 8 (3d Cir. 1972).
132 Id.
'The brief cites Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) at this point.
Hines is a strong implied preemption case.
15449 U.S.C. 5 1302(a) (1970).
15271 U.S. 153 (1926).
... 175 Neb. 501, 122 N.W.2d 476 (1963).
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only extended to interstate commerce, the Court upheld the Com-
mission's action:
This railroad, like most others, was chartered to engage in both
intrastate and interstate commerce. The same instrumentality serves
both. The two services are inextricably intertwined. The extent and
the manner in which one is performed, necessarily affects the per-
formance of the other. Efficient performance of either is dependent
upon the efficient performance of the transportation system as a
whole.'
Frontier Air Lines involved an interstate air carrier that had pro-
curred a Civil Aeronautics Board order to abandon unprofitable
intra-Nebraska routes. The Nebraska Supreme Court noted, in up-
holding the action of the Board, that the intertwinement of an in-
terstate carrier's interstate and intrastate routes was essentially a
national concern:
That Congress has adopted a general plan to regulate aviation in
interstate commerce is apparent. If the Nebraska State Railway
Commission under the guise of regulating intrastate commerce can
require service to be continued on routes or segments of routes
suspended or deleted by the Federal Board created by the Act of
Congress to regulate such service every other state may do the
same. Under those circumstances the general plan of regulation
adopted by Congress would be wholly nullified. The subject is ob-
viously national in character and uniformity of regulation through-
out the nation is required."'
This overview of the economic regulations of interstate air car-
riage presents a clouded and confusing picture. While federal au-
thority is clearly exclusive in the area of the interstate operations of
interstate carriers, the lines between state and federal authority in
the regulation of intrastate operations of interstate carriers is not
so sharply drawn. The Civil Aeronautics Board and the courts have
distinguished between the various functions of the interstate car-
riers operating intrastate; routes and scheduling are deemed to de-
mand national uniformity while rates and certification procedures
"1 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 at 164 (1926).
158Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Aeronautics, 175 Neb. 501,
122 N.W.2d 476 at 488 (1963). See also Nebraska Dept. of Aeronautics v. CAB,
298 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962). The strongly national character of the operations
of interstate air carriers is illustrated by cases dealing with the capitalization of
interstate air carriers. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Com'n, 207
N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1965); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Nebraska State Railway Com'n,
172 Neb. 784, 112 N.W.2d 414 (1961).
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do not. The inconsistency is obvious. The same factors demanding
uniformity in one area of the economic regulation of interstate air
carriers would seem to operate in the others. Certainly, the federal
scherne regarding rates is no less pervasive than that governing
routes; neither would the intertwining of federal and state interests
appear to be any less in one area than the other. A single federal
Act and a single congressional purpose pervades the entire area.
The Second Circuit in Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.", in inter-
preting a tarriff provision of an interstate carrier, recognized this:
A primary purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act is to assure uni-
formity of rates and services to all persons using the facilities of air
carriers. To achieve this, it is essential, in the judgment of Congress,
that a single agency, rather than numerous courts under diverse
laws, have primary responsibility for supervising rates and serv-
ices."'
Although the view taken in Lichten seems to be more closely in
accord with the congressional intent expressed in the Federal Avi-
ation Acts of 1938 and 1958, this does not belie the fact that the
contrary view expressed in People v. Western Air Lines currently
enjoys wide acceptance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current Supreme Court interpretation of the commerce clause
would allow Congress to create exclusive federal regulation in the
entire fled of aeronautics, whether the regulated activities occur be-
tween states or are confined to a single state. Congress intended to
utilize a great deal of this potential authority when it created the
Aeronautics Acts of 1938 and 1958. Because air transport is essen-
tially interstate and international in scope, Congress recognized its
responsibility to create a uniform body of law to regulate the indus-
try. ' The interstate character of the aeronautics industry, together
with the importance to the development of the national economy
119 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
160 Id. at 941. Any action that arises from a tariff duly filed with the CAB is
to be determined exclusively by federal law. Mustard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (1959); Rosenchein v. Trans World Air Lines,
Inc., 349 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc.,
103 Ohio App. 172, 144 N.E.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1956).
16See Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Commerce by the States, 31 VA.
L. REv. 479 (1945).
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of an adequate interstate air network free from significant eco-
nomic and safety problems has given rise to an extraordinary feder-
al interest in commercial aeronautics. The result has been an in-
dustry that is so heavily regulated by the federal government that it
is virtually a public utility."
These concerns of Congress are strongly reflected in the field of
safety regulation and airspace management. The safety and envir-
onmental control provisions contained in the Federal Aviation Act
and in FAA regulations have been found to be so pervasive by the
courts that an intent by Congress to exclude concurrent state reg-
ulations has been implied.
The trend toward federal preemption that dominates the area of
airspace control has not been followed in the economic realm. The
reason cited most often for this fact lies in the definitions of "air
transportation" and "air commerce" appearing in the Federal Avi-
ation Act that are assumed to indicate an intent by Congress to
restrict federal economic authority over air carriage. Some degree
of concurrent state authority was also assumed to have been con-
templated. Reliance on this assumption has generated a tremen-
dous amount of uncertainty and litigation since no consistent pat-
tern of federal-state regulation has been articulated.
The best example of this confusion is the economic regulations
of interstate air carriers. The distinction, in the economic regula-
tion of these carriers, between rates and certification on the one
hand, and routes and services on the other, is illogical and should
be ended. The Civil Aeronautics Board has the statutory authority
and a congressional mandate to exclusively control the affairs of
the interstate carriers, even when operating over intrastate routes.
The de minimis rule and the intertwinement theory, advanced by
the CAB and the courts on occasion, are much more in line with
the interests Congress hoped to promote in enacting federal avia-
tion legislation than the unrealistic and irregularly used interstate-
intrastate distinction based on the Federal Aviation Acts' defini-
tional section.
The definitional argument, however, has much more validity
when intrastate carriers are at issue. Here, federal interests are in-
direct and the de minimus and intertwinement ideas are less appli-
"2 See Id.; Calkins, Federal-State Regulation of Aviation, 50 VA. L. REV.
1386 (1964).
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cable. A state's interest in regulating carriers that operate exclusive-
ly within its borders, especially when it can be shown the carrier
has a positive economic effect, will be given great weight by the
courts. If, as the majority of the courts and the CAB have reasoned,
the distinction between the terms "air transportation" and "air
commerce" demand some degree of concurrent state economic
regulation, that state control should be limited to intrastate carriers
operating exclusively within one state. It is only in this relatively
confined area that federal interests, as expressed in the Federal
Aviation Act, are not substantial enough to exclude local authority.
Even if confined to purely intrastate air carriage, the wisdom of
this concurrent state control may be doubted. The congressional
histories of the 1938 and 1958 Aviation Acts, although not di-
rectly supporting complete federal preemption, do show a great
concern for creating uniformity in both the safety and economic
areas. The two fields, while they are artificially separated in federal
legislation, are in actuality highly interrelated. Consistent and sound
economic policy is as necessary to the development of a national
air transport network as are policies regulating the use of airspace.
For example, the diversion suffered by Pacific Air Lines in Cali-
fornia due to intrastate competition by Pacific Southwest Air Lines
is significant and injurious to the national system. Not only may
routes and service to some areas be altered, but the rate and subsidy
system worked out by the CAB may be affected.
No court, however, has been willing to find that these adverse
economic effects alone will allow federal authority to move into
the field of purely intrastate air carriage under present federal law.
The CAB, noting this weakness in the existing Federal Aviation
Act, stated:
The adverse impact of intrastate operations upon interstate carri-
ers might well make their regulation by the Board desirable in order
to achieve the overall goals of the Federal Aviation Act and war-
rant Congress in broadening the regulated class." '
There can be little doubt that independent and inconsistent state
action is likely to interfere with the federal program of a balanced,
competitively controlled, national-international system of commer-
cial aviation. While it is true there are certain advantages due to
"' CAB Order 71-6-79, Docs. 2304-7 and 23122 at 8 (June 15, 1971).
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increased competition and the superior knowledge and concern
state aeronautics agencies may have of local problems, these facts
are not conclusive. No economic need or essential public interest
requires the assertion of state regulation. There is no reason why
federal authority is not or could not be made adequate to deal with
local as well as national problems. The CAB could be as fully
acquainted with the requirements of service within the state as the
state agency itself.'" Also, there is no reason to believe the CAB
could not stimulate the benefits of competition as some intrastate
carriers have done.
The inestimable benefits of a unified and coordinated develop-
ment of aeronautics is more important than the positive effects of
concurrent state control. Congress ought to amend the Federal
Aviation Act to give the federal government equal power in both
the safety and economic fields as well as including provisions co-
ordinating state taxation of interstate carriers." A clear statement
by Congress recognizing the national concern for the economic
development of the air transport industry should find expression in
federal law. This legislative statement would not only aid in
economic development, but would end once and for all the con-
fusion that has been the hallmark of air carrier economic regula-
tion.
1"Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Commerce by the States, 31 VA. L.
REv. 479 at 526 (1945).
165 Congress has the power under the commerce clause to regulate any ac-
tivity related to aeronautics.
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